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DE RUEHMO #1584 2891557 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 161557Z OCT 06 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3972 INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL MOSCOW 011584

STPDTS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2016

TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC KNNP UNSC KN RS
SUBJECT: INFORMATION REGARDING UNSCR 1718: DEMARCHE

DELIVERED

REF: A. STATE 172816 ¶B. MOSCOW 11488

Classified By: Amb. William J. Burns. For Reasons 1.4(b/d).

- (C) We delivered reftel demarche October 16 to MFA First Asia Department Senior Counselor Arkadiy Lavrov, who advises DFM Alekseyev on North Korean issues. (Note: Alekseyev is currently in South Korea, accompanying PM Fradkov and will not return to Moscow before October 23). Pointing to Russia's vote in the Security Council, Arkadiy Lavrov underlined Russian support for the resolution, but said Russia sought more information on U.S policy after the adoption of the resolution. Specifically:
- --Russia and China wanted to have a better understanding of the situation following the adoption of the resolution, but the U.S. appeared to be in a hurry. Based on his 21 years of service in Pyongyang, Arkadiy Lavrov stressed that the North Koreans were already used to living under extremely difficult economic conditions. Effective implementation of the resolution would require a careful approach. China, which supplies energy and most consumer goods to North Korea, would play a major role in the success of sanctions.
- --In Moscow's view, the U.S. was the key to bringing the North back to the Six-Party talks. During DFM Alekseyev's talks in Pyongyang over the weekend, the North showed a softer stance and might be willing to return to the talks. The bottom line for the North was direct negotiations with the U.S. Russia urged the U.S. to be more flexible because excessive pressure on North Korea could be counterproductive and might create an even more dangerous situation on the peninsula, including the possibility of the DPRK conducting a second nuclear test.
- --Russia remained unsure about the implementation of two items in the resolution: financial sanctions and inspection of North Korean ships.
- 12. (C) Arkadiy Lavrov underlined that the resolution would be a source of great irritation to North Korea. He warned of a sharp deterioration of the situation in the region and said that the U.S. underestimated Kim's "decisiveness," could bring unexpected and unwelcome results. BURNS